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Introduction
What should law students learn from the ethics project in legal education? The traditional
answer, at least in Australian legal education, has been that students must be taught "legal
ethics". Typically, this is seen as a body of role-specific rules about lawyers' duties to clients
and to the administration of justice. Often, these rules of professional responsibility are
taught as part of a single course that bears a title such as "Legal Ethics", "Lawyers and
Ethics" or "The Legal Profession".
This paper proposes a different answer. We suggest that students must be provided with
opportunities to learn that lawyers' work inevitably involves discretion and choice; that
students must be encouraged to develop a thorough understanding of the practitioner's
enduring responsibility to make and to justify ethical choices in the course of legal practice;
and that students must therefore be given opportunities to develop their abilities to make
justifiable choices so that they are better equipped to meet the ethical challenges of legal prac-
tice. Although this answer is presented in the context of Australian legal education, we sug-
gest that it may have broader relevance to the general question about how to approach the
learning and teaching of legal ethics in law schools.
This answer seems to be unconventional. As far as we can tell, the legal ethics project in
Australian legal education, and elsewhere, does not emphasise discretion and choice in the
lawyer's role.1 Limited evidence suggests that much, but not all, Australian legal education
is more likely to contain a message that is opposite to the one we recommend. The more likely
message is that lawyers' ethical decision making is principally about following the require-
ments set out in the law of lawyering, which itself is seen to be more-or-less categorical and
' Both of thc Socio-Lcgal Rcscarch Ccntrc, Griffith Law School, Quccnsland, Australia. A draft ofthis papcr
was presented at the "Professional Ethics and Personal Integrity" Conference in Auckland, 23 25 June 2006. W. e
would likc to thank Iillian Corbin, Julian Wcbb, thc conference participants, and two anonymous rcfcrees for thcir
comments on the draft, and Justin Carter for editorial assistance.
' Though note, as a limitcd cxception, R.II.S. Tur's bricf discussion of thc potcntial of legal cthics rules-
following A. Kadish and S. Kadish, Distretion to Disobey (Stanford, CA, Stanford Uni ersity Press, 1973)-to per
form a rccourse rolc "by establishing conditions undcr which thc agent may be justified in undcrtaking actions that
depart from the primary role requirements. Recourse roles extend a liberty in handling role obligations." See Tur's
review of Nicolson and Webb's Proessional Lega1lEthics (2001) 4 LegalEthics 66, 69. Cp also R. I.S. Tur, "Mcdical
Confidentiality and Disclosure: Moral Conscience and Legal Constraints" (1998) 15 Jornnal of Applied Philosoply
15, 21-22.
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comprehensive; and that ethical issues in lawyering that fall outside the perceived ambit of
these laws are not worthy of much attention, if any, in legal studies.
There is another sense in which this answer is unconventional. The approach we recom-
mend is based principally on social scientific studies of lawyers' work, rather than on norma-
tive accounts of lawyers' professional responsibility. We argue that this research suggests that
legal practice frequently invites lawyers to make decisions about how they will do their work.
This is because the lawyer's very role is permeated with opportunities for choice, despite the
rules-rich environment in which lawyers practise. Lawyers' work, in other words, contains
multiple discretionary zones in which choices are constantly invited. These opportunities to
make choices, and the responsibilities that go with them, involve the core questions of
lawyering. They concern questions about whom to represent and, more prolifically, about
how to represent clients at each and every stage of the retainer. Much of the time they also
involve issues of moral significance, meaning that they are directly relevant to ethical deci-
sion making in legal practice.
Our argument involves three parts. First, we note that current Australian practice in legal
ethics teaching in many, but not all, law schools involves a "professional duties" approach to
legal ethics learning. We also observe, from the evidence available, that Australian legal edu-
cation has not yet demonstrated good student learning outcomes in legal ethics. Second, we
revisit a well-established, but still somewhat controversial, proposition in the normative and
theoretical literature on lawyers' professional responsibility which suggests that despite the
abundance of rules that regulate lawyers' professional activities, lawyers inevitably possess
some measure of discretion, and therefore some degree of moral autonomy, in the way that
they discharge their duties. We then go on to explore this proposition through social scien-
tific research on lawyers. On our reading, this literature makes a similar claim about the inci-
dence and scope of discretion and choice in lawyers' actual practices. Third, and on the
premise that lawyers do indeed have choices in the sense we describe, we argue that the legal
ethics project in legal education should approach ethics learning from the position of profes-
sional discretion, and the responsibility that this carries, rather than from the position of
professional rules. Our argument is that teaching that is designed to encourage students to
come to terms with both the frequency and the situational complexity of ethical decision
making, in the many discretionary spaces that inhabit the lawyer's role, may result in quali-
tatively better "ethics" learning outcomes than those so far demonstrated in Australian legal
education.
Our suggestions regarding the legal ethics project in legal education are principally about
content, that is, what we might expect students to learn from the ethics project in legal edu-
cation. It is not our intention here to address the (equally challenging) question of how stu-
dents might be encouraged into the quality of learning we are recommending. Given that this
is a submission about content, it is possible that the learning outcomes it envisages can be
planned for in various ways. While we believe that a curriculum-wide approach to learning
and teaching in legal ethics is undoubtedly preferable in terms of the likely quality of student
learning outcomes, the approach we suggest could also inform a stand-alone course in
lawyers' professional responsibility, as well as ethical practice learning in the clinic.
LEGAL ETHICS LEARNING
Legal Ethics in Australian Legal Education
As is the case in other jurisdictions, the Australian law of lawyering contains a more or less
identifiable category of rules and standards often loosely referred to as "legal ethics". These
are also known as the laws, standards or rules of professional responsibility. They are said to
regulate professional conduct, and amount to a "series of duties" owed by lawyers to the law,
the courts, clients and the profession itself.2 These duties originate in legislation, case law
and in professional rules drafted by professional bodies.
3
A common belief, both in Australia and elsewhere, is that lawyers need to understand
these duties to practise well. A stronger version of this belief is that lawyers need only to
understand these duties to practise well. Given assumptions such as these, it follows that a
responsible legal education is one that "transmits" these "norms of behaviour" to law stu-
dents, so that future practitioners are appropriately trained in the "specific cultural forms of
legal practice". 4 It is therefore also not surprising that the Australian body that has deter-
mined the content of the law school curriculum has deemed that these rules must be taught
to law students.9 Miore recently, the Australian Law Reform Commission appears to have
endorsed this in stating that Australian legal education "should involve the development of
... a deep appreciation of ethical standards and professional responsibility".
6
In one interpretation, this conception of legal ethics takes the laws of professional respon-
sibility (hereafter "the rules") to be "a system of bright-line rules", 7 which provide a
"robust" source of ethical authority' for practising lawyers. The basic premise of this con-
ception is that, with some exceptions,9 the lawyer's role is effectively constrained by formal
rules that can be "applied in a legalistic and categorical fashion" ' to answer the ethical
2 This phraseology appears in Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Adversarial .ysten of
Litigation Rehinking Legal 1ducalion and Training, Issues Paper No 21 (1997), para 6.14. A standard Australian
text on lawyers' professional responsibility, which meticulously sets out these duties as well as other aspects of the
Australian law on lawycring, is G.E. Dal Pont, Lawryers'Prossional ResponsibiliJ, (Sydney, Lawbook Co, 2006).
3 Dal Pont, ibid, 17, noting that the status of these rules is in transition in most Australian states and territories.
The Law Council of Australia's Model Rules o/Pro/ssional Conduct and Practice (2002) is gradually becoming the
common set of standards in most Australian jurisdictions.
4 This is the phrascology used in Australian Law Reform Commission, supra n. 2, para 6.16.
Consultati e Committee of State and Territorial Law Admitting Authorities, Un(ifrm -hdmission Requirements:
Discussion Paper and Recommendations (1992). The Australian 'Priestly' requirements concerning professional
responsibility have recently been reproduced in the Supreme Court (Legal Practitioner Admission) Rules 2004
(Qjd), 32 thus: "knowlcdgc of the various pertinent rules concerning a practitioner's duty to the law, the Courts,
clients and fellow practitioners".
6 Recommendation 2 in Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Juslice: A Review of Ihe Federal Civil
Justice 5)stem (2000), para 2.89, although neither the meaning nor the pedagogical implications of "deep apprecia
tion" were explored in the report.
7 D. Luban, "Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics" (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 873, 876. In fact, the docu
ments that contain ethical standards arc, more often than not, called lawyers' practice "rules": Law Council of'
Australia, supra n. 3; Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2004 (Qld); American Bar Association, Model Rules of
Pro/?ssional Conduct (2002).
8 R. Vischer, "Legal Adx ice as Moral Perspectiv e", Research Paper No 05 03, Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, University of'St Thomas School of Law (2005), 41.
9 Except to the extent to which the rules of professional responsibility themselxes admit discretion on the part
oflawycrs themselves. See, for example, Law Council of Australia, supra n. 3, rules 13.1 (on "forensic judgment")
and 13.2.
" D. Nicolson andJ. Webb, ProfessionalLegalElhics: Crilicallnerrogalions (Oxford University Press, 1999), 278.
MICHAEL ROBERTSON AND KIERAN TRANTER
dilemmas that lawyers might face. 11 A strong version of this conception is that lawyers' "obe-
dience to formally laid down norms [is] the beginning and end of ethical obligation". 12
Much recent scholarship criticises the premises inherent in the "bright line" conception
of legal ethics, both in Australia and abroad. 13 For example, William Simon has argued that
the emphasis on categorical and mechanical judgment is irreconcilable with powerful argu-
ments elsewhere in jurisprudence, which insist that legal judgment is "characteristically con-
textual". 14 Likewise, David Luban has demonstrated that "rule application theory" is
incapable of providing sufficient guidance for the serious task of making judgments in legal
practice. 1 Others, including Alan Hutchinson, have argued that merely following the rules
of professional responsibility is seldom straightforward, not least of all because rule inter-
pretation itself is fraught with difficulty. 16 In Australia, Stephen Parker has suggested that
"[m]erely cramming more codes into [students'] heads is something, but it is not as good as
also sharpening up ethical sensitivity so that lawyers are alive to the issues".17 And David
Wilkins has claimed that lawyers themselves "inevitably exercise discretionary power over
the substantive content of legal rules",18 including the ones that are supposed to constrain
them. 19 This means, for example, that it would be most unfortunate if an educational focus
on the rules of professional responsibility amounted to training in how best to avoid the very
practices that they were intended to regulate. 2 1
The net effect of these and other criticisms is to question quite forcefully the assumption
that the law of lawyering necessarily has a great deal to say about lawyers' ethical practices as
" Simon makes a similar point in referring to what hc calls the dominant views on legal ethical dccision-making,
and the idea that a "rigid" rule of responsibility dictates a "particular response": XW. Simon, The Practice of Justice:
A Theory ol/'Law)jers'Ethics (Cambridge, MA, IIarvard University Press, 1998), 9.
12 Nicolson and Webb, supra n. 10, 278. An Australian variation of this perspective, in its application to legal edu
cation, acknowledges that law students might also study the relationship between these rules and "broader social
ethics or morality ", but that such an inquiry "generally remain[s] a secondary focus of ethical training": Australian
lIaw Rcform Commission, supra n. 2, para 6.16.
13 Particularly in the United States and in Canada. Some of this criticism has also been evident in the work of a
relatively small number of Australian authors such as Y. Ross, Ethics in Law (Sydney, lcxisNcxis Buttcrworths,
2005); C. Parker, "What do they Learn when they Learn Legal Lthics?" (2001) 12 Legal Edation Rezview 175;
C. Sampford and S. Blcncowc, "Educating Lawyers to bc Ethical Advisors" in K. Economidcs (cd), Ethical
Challenges to Legal Education and Condutt (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), 315; A. Goldsmith and G. Powles,
"Lawyers Behaving Badly: Where Now in Legal Education for Acting Responsibly in Australia?" in K. Economidcs
(ed), Ethical Challenges to Legal Education and Conduct (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), 119; S. Parker,
"Introduction" in S. Parker and C. Sampfrd (cds), Legal Ethics and Legal Practice: Contemporar' Issues (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1995), 1, 3; C. Sampford and C. Parker, "Legal Regulation, Ethical Standard Setting, and
Institutional Design" in S. Parker and C. Sampford (cds), Legal Ethics and Legal Practice: Contemporary' Isues
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), 11, 15. In the United Kingdom see, for example, Nicolson and Webb, supra n. 10,
278.
14 Simon, swpra n. 11, 3.
i D. Luban, "Epistemology and Moral Education" (1983) 33 Journal of Legal Education 636; D. Luban and
M. \lilleman, "Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times" (1995) 9 GeorgetownJounal oLegal Ethics 31,
39-41.
16 A. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibilit (Toronto, Irwin Law, 1999), 42; Nicolson and
Wcbb, supra n. 10, 1 H-]6.
17 S. Parker, Cost of Legal Services and Litigation: Legal Education, Discussion Paper No. 5, Australian Senate
Standing Committee on Icgal and Constitutional Affairs (1992), para 6.104.
s D. Wilkins, "Legal Realism for Lawyers" (1990) 104 Harvard Law Review 468, 469-70.
9 Ibid, 497.
20 C. Nienkel Meadow, "CanaLaw teacherANoid Teaching LegalEthics?" (1991)4 irnalofLegalEdmcatioin
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such. 21 At the very least, lawyers' ethical practice involves far more than mechanically fol-
lowing lawyers' rules. This poses something of a challenge for legal education. If "training"
of law students in ethical competency cannot be achieved by "transmitting" to them the
norms of professional behaviour, 22 what should they be learning instead of, or as well as,
these rules?
23
During the last decade or so a number of Australian writers have sought directly or indi-
rectly to answer this question, although few have attempted to do so comprehensively. 24
Some, in expressing varying degrees of scepticism for the traditional idea that much can be
achieved by getting students to learn merely about the rules of professional responsibility,
have suggested that the ethics teaching goals need to be broadened 2 s in various ways. For
example, some have suggested that students need to learn the skill of how to identify, reflect
on and resolve ethical dilemmas;26 or that students must come to "appreciate that there is a
moral content to law and practice"; 27 or that students must appreciate the role of "values
underlying the legal system" as well as lawyers' own personal values; 28 or that students must
21 Again, there is a now a substantial body of literature that explores this criticism in great detail. Some law ers'
codes acknowledge some of thcsc shortcomings. Scc, for example, American Bar Association, supra n. 7, para 16
cited in AI. Freedman, "In Praise of Oxerzealous Representation Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and
Other Ethical Conduct", Research Paper No 06-9, I Iotstra University School ofIaw Legal Studies Research Paper
Series (2006), 9. For Australian perspectives on the merits of this criticism see, for example, NI. Robertson,
"Challenges in thc Dcsign of lcgal Ethics Icarning Systems: An Educational Perspective" (2005) 8 Legal Elhics
222, 229; C. Parker, "A Critical lorality for Law) ers: Four Approaches for Lawyers" (2004) 30 Monas/ Ui nize ity)
Law Review 49, 53; Goldsmith and Powlcs, supra n. 13, 141-2.
22 Australian Law Reform Commission, supra n. 2, para 6.16.
23 Aspects ofthis question, from a perspective on learning theory, arc considered in Robcrtson, supra n. 21.
24 Properly speaking, some of this literature has addressed a different question or questions, such as "what shall
we leach?" and "how shall we leach it?" See Dal Pont, supra n. 2; Robcrtson, supra n. 21; Goldsmith and Powlcs,
supra n. 13; K. Tranter, "'Ethical, ooh, Yeah Ethical is Yeah, What's Right Yeah': A Snapshot of First Year Law
Student's Conception of Ethics" (2004) 7 Legal Elhics 86; D. I Icnriss-Andcrson, "Teaching Legal Ethics to First
Year Law Students" (2002) 13 Legal Edaation Review 45; NI. Castles, "Challenges to the Academy: Reflections on
the Teaching of Lcgal Ethics in Australia" (2001) 12 Legal Educalion Review 81 ; B. I Jamilton, "Getting Them Early:
Teaching a Critical Perspective on Legal Ethics and Adversarialism on an Introductory LLB Unit at the
Queensland University of Tcchnology" (2001) 12 Legal Education Review 105; A. Zariski, "Teaching Lcgal Ethics
Online: Pervasive or Exasixe?" (2001) 12 Legal Edcnation Review 131; C. Parker, supra n. 12; AI. Le Brun,
"Enhancing Student Icarning oft Lcgal Ethics and Professional Responsibility in Australian law Schools by
Improxing Our Teaching" (2001) 12 LegalEduaation Review 269; NI. Noone and J. Dickson, "Teaching Towards a
New Professionalism: Challenging Law Students to Become Ethical Lawyers" (2001) 4 Legal Elhic" 127;
J. Giddings, "Teaching the Ethics of Criminal Law and Practice" (2001) 35 Law Teacher 161; S. Christensen and
S. Kift, "Graduate Attributes and Legal Skills: Integration or Disintegration?" (2000) 11 Legal Educalion Review 206;
F. Armer, "The Teaching of Lthics in Australian Law Schools" (1998) 167ournal of Pro fessional Leoa LEduction 247;
G. Powlcs, "Taking the Plunge: Integrating Legal Ethics in Australia" (1998) 33 Law Teacher 316; Sampford and
Blencowe, supra n. 13; A. Goldsmith, "Heroes or Technicians? The M\Loral Capacities of Tomorrow's Lawyers"
(1996) 14 Journal of'Proi>onal Legal Education 1; S. Parker and C. Sampford, Legal Elhics and Legal Praclice:
Contemporay Issues (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996); S. Burns, "Teaching Legal Ethics" (1993) 4 Legal Education
Reziew 141 ; Parker, supra n. 21 (although this article does not really address approaches to ethics in teaching).
25 Goldsmith and Powles, supra n. 13, 141-4, which is one of the most thoughtful and comprehensive contribu
tions to Australian literature on this topic.
26 Christenson and Kift, supra n. 24; Giddings, supra n. 24; Hamilton, supra n. 24.
27 Noonc and Dickson, swpra n. 24, 133; Ross, supra n. 13, 27-28; Sampford and Blcncowc, supra n. 13, 335;
Armer, supra n. 24, 253.
2s As part ofan attempt to cncouragc cognitivc, affcctivc and skill lcarning (Ilcnriss-Andcrson, supra n. 24, 49),
which is one of the few contributions that directly addresses, and justifies, the question about the learning outcomes
that cducators dcsirc for thcir studcnts. Anothcr that attcmpts to do so is Burns, supra n. 24. For an argumcnt about
the need for students "to critically ex aluate" the practice of lawy ering and to "decide for themselx es what j ustifica
tions arc rclcvant" scc Sampford and Parker, supra n. 13, 20.
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develop an "ethical orientation" that includes "reflective engagement" on the broader social
role of the lawyer; 29 or that students must "develop the ability to make ethical decisions in
real life situations"; 31 or that students should be encouraged to examine the "sociology of
everyday practices settings" and also the notion of "judgment" itself.31
What impact has this and other critical scholarship 32 had on approaches to ethics teaching
in Australian legal education? The most recent "stocktake" of Australian legal education pre-
sents a slightly uncertain answer to this question. In summarising their findings regarding
"the teaching of ethics", the authors of the Australian Universities Teaching Committee
(AUTC) commissioned report confirm that most law schools "include ethics in the LLB cur-
riculum" in a variety of ways. 33 However, the report reveals little detail about the nature of
the ethics learning outcomes that law schools seek to achieve, beyond suggesting that the rules
of professional responsibility remain a primary focus, 34 and that some schools also explore
values, moral aspects of ethics, ethical dilemmas, and social justice issues.35
One interpretation of these findings is that, taken as a whole, the performance of
Australian law school education in the field of legal ethics until around 2003 was unspectac-
ular at best. This appears to be consistent with previous research into the state of ethics
teaching and learning in Australian legal education. For example, a few years before the
AUTC Report, an independent reviewer gave a rather bleak assessment of performance in
the area, predicting also that the future of teaching and learning in ethics "may prove disap-
pointing".36 Amongst the concerns expressed, then, was evidence of a discernible lack of
commitment and enthusiasm, on the part of law teachers, for student learning in ethics 37 and
a lack of consensus about the very nature and future direction of the ethics project itself.38
What, then, of actual student learning outcomes in ethics in Australian law school educa-
tion over the past decade? Although this seems to be an important question, it has seldom
been asked, let alone answered. 39 No doubt part of the difficulty is being able to marshal
29 Goldsmith, supra n. 24, 10.
30 Castles, supra n. 24, 103.
Goldsmith and Powlcs, supra n. 13, 143-4, in which the reference to the sociology ofpractice is taken from
R. Gordon and XX. Simon, "The Redemption of Professionalism?" in R. Nelson, D. Trubek and R. Solomon (eds),
Law yers'Ideals/Law yers'Praclices: Tran'lormalions in lhe American Legal Proession (Ithaca, NY, Corncll University
Press, 1992), 230, 238; on the goal of students learning about judgment see also C. Parker, supra n. 13, 177 8, 199.
2 Much of the Australian writing in this area has been informed by scholarship elsewhere, and has explored
questions similar to ones in estigated by American, Canadian and British scholars in particular.
3 R. Johnstone and S. Vignacndra, Learning Oulcomes and Curriculum Development in Law: A Reporl
Commissioned hy the Austrahan Unize;sities Teaching Committee (AUTC) (Canberra, ACT, Australian Unixersities
Teaching Committee, 2003), 122. In most schools, ethics is "taught" in compulsory subjects, and some arc "stand-
alone" ones. In others, ethics is part of a larger subject. Some schools reported that ethics was included "at differ
cnt parts ofthc curriculum", but in others "there were no formal arrangements to ensure a co-ordinatcd approach
to the teaching of legal ethics, and its infusion throughout the curriculum".
'4 Ibid, 165; the report notes criticism ofthis focus from some respondents in the "stock-takc" process.
31 Ibid, 119 21.
36 Ic Brun, supra n. 24, 277.
37 Apparently, man) Australian legal academics continue to disregard the importance of the ethics project in legal
education: Ross, supra n. 13, 26.
38 Le Brun, supra n. 24, 276 9. Similar sentiments about the failings of Australian law schools in this area were
recorded a fcw years before Lc Brun's assessment: Goldsmith and Powlcs, supra n. 13, 120.
31 For example, the AUTC Report makes no reference to ethics learning outcomes as such, prov iding evidence
mainly about the incidence of inclusion of ethics in law school curricula together with some details of claims about
how ethics is taught, be it in single or multiple subjects: Johnstone and Vignaendra, supra n. 33, 118 23. But see the
reference to the study below.
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sufficiently reliable information about actual student learning outcomes, as distinct merely
from claims that imply that students have learned as their teachers intended. 4 1 While a few
teachers have published answers to this question by drawing on evaluations from their own
students, 41 these isolated accounts say little or nothing about the quality of ethics learning
outcomes across the sector as a whole. However, an ongoing empirical study of a sample of
Australian law students provides some evidence about actual ethics learning outcomes. The
most striking interim finding is that undergraduate legal ethics education has had a "neutral
impact ... on the values expressed by lawyers in their ethical decision making.42
Given the insufficiency of reliable evidence, it is not possible to know exactly what
Australian law students are learning from the ethics project in legal education. 43 It seems rea-
sonable to assume, at least, that most law students44 know something about the rules of pro-
fessional responsibility by the time they graduate. But, beyond that, the nature and quality
of ethics learning outcomes is, at best, uncertain. Based on all of this information, it seems
quite reasonable to draw the conclusion that there is little room for complacency in the ethics
project in Australian legal education, assuming that it continues to be an important one.
Good student learning outcomes in legal ethics have yet to be demonstrated in Australian
legal education. 4
5
What Lawyers Do: Empirical Accounts of Lawyer Behaviour
Reference was made earlier to the idea that legal ethical responsibility is essentially about the
application of formal rules of lawyering to answer the ethical dilemmas that lawyers might
face. This perspective, which may still be dominant in ethics teaching in Australian law
schools, places great emphasis on the assumed functional importance of the rules of lawyer-
ing for ethical practice itself. But, from a somewhat different perspective, apparently
controversial to rules theorists, the rules of lawyering alone are seen seldom to provide the
direction needed for sound legal ethical practice. This position is exemplified by Hazard:
"From the choice-making viewpoint of the lawyer ... the realm of professional ethics is not a
rule-determined domain. Rather, it is a domain where the lawyer has pervasive marginal discre-
tion guided by a few fundamental legal rules and constrained by circumstances of practice." 4 6
40 A similar example is prox ided in the assessment carried out bx Le Brun where the author ga e the example of
a law school claiming to have adopted the "pervasive method" of legal ethics teaching and learning, but noted that
"there was no concrete evidence to support the statement": Le Brun, supra n. 24, 279.
41 For example, C. Parker, supra n. 13, which is a rare example of a genuine attempt to provide evidence ofstu-
dent learning outcomes in ethics. See also Noone and Dickson, supra n. 24; and Giddings, supra n. 24, 178.
42 A. Evans andJ. Palermo, "Zero Impact: Arc Lawyers' Values Affected by I.aw School?" (2005) 8 LegalEthics
240, 264. An earlier pilot study b) E ans came to a similar conclusion: see A. E ans, "Lawyers' Perceptions of their
Values: An Empirical Assessment of Monash University Graduates in Iaw, 1980-1998" (2001) 12 Legal Educalion
Review 209, 265.
4" For example, wc arc unable to refer to any evidence regarding the achievements ot Practical Legal Training.
"PLT" programmes are now the standard, postgraduate route to professional admission in Australian jurisdictions.
44 But apparently not all: sCC Johnstone and Vignacndra, supra n. 33, 118.
4 Rhode's remarks about the "state of professional ethics instruction" in the United States are worth noting.
There, despite considerably more attention being paid to the ethics project in legal education, ethics in many laws
schools is still "relegated" to a single, lowly subject that focuses uncritically on the rules of professional responsibil
ity: scc D. Rhode and D. Luban, Legal Elhics (New York, Foundation Press, 2004), 1031; and D. Rhode, "It'
Integrity is the Answer, What is the Question?" (2003) 72 loidlhamn Law Review 333.
46 G. I Jazard, Jr, "Ethical Opportunity in the Practice of I.aw" (1990) 27 San Diego Law Reviem 127, 128.
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A large and growing social scientific scholarship on lawyers at work seems to make similar
claims about the "discretionary" nature of lawyering within the contextual constraints that
accompany different practice settings. In this section, we aim to explore the possibility that
these studies of lawyers and clients provide an alternative resource for the study of legal ethics,
and therefore suggest an alternative approach to ethics learning in law school education. The
studies to which we will refer contain a claim about the nature of legal practice, a claim about
the world as it is, rather than a claim based on prior principles. Typically, the work is induc-
tive, based on evidence of actual lawyer behaviour, and as such it is open to social scientific
investigation. So far, this literature has not received much attention in many well-known
contributions on legal ethics. 47 Yet, as Granfield and Koening have suggested, "Unfortunately,
most critiques of legal ethics and legal ethics education are based on the author's personal
insights and observations rather then on systematic empirical research that focuses on how
attorneys experience ethical issues within the context of their practice". 4
Social scientific studies of lawyers belong within the sociology of the professions, a field
that emerged post-war, reflecting both the empirical turn in the social sciences and also polit-
ical concern with the role and status of the professions. 49 In studying doctors, lawyers and
academics, foundational researchers developed accounts of what these professionals did,
emphasising the institutional and personal contexts of professional conduct.' In doing so,
the early sociology of the professions problematised the notion of "professional autonomy",S1
and considered professional action as neither reconcilable with bureaucratic rationalisation 2
nor comprehensible according to the norm-based, public service tradition of professional-
ism.53 While claims that doctors, lawyers and academics are not amendable to bureaucracy
seems quaint given the contemporary "corporate" structure of medical practice, large law
firms and the market-sensitive university,54 the challenge of the sociology of the professions
was in the sources used. Instead of deductively trying to determine what professionals do
from theoretical accounts of the supposed role of the professions, or assuming that profes-
sionals act according to a set of official norms, the sociology of the professions movement
17 Scc, for example, Simon, supra n. 11. Simon rcfcrs to only two "sociological" pieces: Talcott Parsons' loun-
dational essay on lawyers from a functional sociological perspectixe (T. Parsons, "A Sociologist Looks at the Legal
Profession" in Essa),s in Sociological Theory (New York, Frcc Press, 1954); and a study of' police bchaviour
(Al. Orfield, "Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule in the
Chicago Criminal Courts" (1992) 63 University o/Colorado Lai ReieP 75). The message seems to bc that cmpiri-
cal studies of lawyers need not influence an account of legal ethics.
4 R. Granficld and T. Kocning, "'It's Hard to bc a Human Being and a Lawyer': Young Attorneys and the
Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice" (2003) 105 West Vir ginia Law Review 495. Similar calls
have bccn made by Wilkins: D. Wilkins, "Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in I.cgal
Ethics" in A. Sarat, MI. Mlinow and T. Rakoff (eds), Everyday Practices and Troubling Cases (Eanston, IL,
Northwestern University Press, 1998), 68.
41 See, for example, T. Roszak, The Making of/a Counter Culture: Reflections ofthe Technocratic Soaiety and its
Youlh/itd Opposition (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1968).
o See, for example, J. Ben David, "The Professional Role of Physician in Bureaucratized Medicine: A Stud) in
Role Conflict" (1958) 11 Human Relailions 255; M. Goss, "Influence and Authority among Physicians in an
Outpatient Clinic" (1961) 26 Ameitan So ialogital Review 39.
See 1. Wilson, The Academic Man: A Sludj in Ihe Sociology c/'a Pro,ssion (New York, Octagon Press, 1942).
52 R. Merton, Social Thew ; anidSoial Stiutture (New York, Free Press, 1968), 261-78.
5' J. Carlin, Lawyers' Elhics: A Survey, ojihe New York Ci5y Bar (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1966),
6-7.
5' On the bureaucratic nature of the current legal academy in Australia see N. James, "Powcr-Knowlcdgc in
Australian Legal Education: Corporatism's Reign" (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 587; NI. Thornton, "The Idea of
the University and the Contemporary Legal Academy" (2004) 26 S'dnei Law Review 481.
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gathered social scientific data to get a "clear understanding of prevailing work environments
in and out of formal organizations". 9'
Two of the earliest seminal studies of the legal profession, by O'Gorman and Carlin, were
based on interviews with New York lawyers in 1957 and 1960 respectively. s6 In the late
1960s, Rosenthal extended his data-gathering to interviewing clients in a widely cited study
on the relations between lawyers and clients. 57 In the 1980s, Sarat and Felstiner revisited
themes in Rosenthal's study. In addition to interviewing lawyers, Sarat and Felstiner also
analysed transcripts of lawyer and client interviews 8 Interviews and surveys have subse-
quently been the dominant data-gathering methods in the empirical studies of lawyers, s9
although there have also been some ethnographic studies based on the "participant observa-
tion" of lawyers (and law students) at work. 6 1
In the last 50 years these studies have extended to other jurisdictions. However, despite
the different methods and agendas of individual researchers, a core finding of these studies,
as we read them, is that different lawyers who practise in the same areas of law nevertheless
provide their services differently. This can be seen, for example, in Rosenthal's study where
clients going to similar law firms in the same practice area often experienced very different
standards of lawyering. 61 In a similar vein, Mather, McEwen and Mlaiman report on how
lawyers made decisions in situations of conflict. They show that two lawyers, again in simi-
lar practice circumstances, decided on different courses of action. One lawyer reported
choosing between two courses of action: either refusing to represent both parties, or declar-
ing which party would be represented. The other lawyer allowed the parties to determine
who was to be represented. 62 What these and other empirical studies also demonstrate is that
lawyers constantly make decisions as to how to deal with their clients, and how to service
their needs, throughout the course of the lawyer-client relationship.
On the basis of these kinds of observations of differences in lawyers' responses, it is possi-
ble to make an inductive point: that difference in lawyering come about because the role of
the lawyer, for whatever reason, involves opportunities for individual practitioners to choose
H. O'Gorman, Lawyers and Matrnionial Cases: A Study qf Infimal Pressures in Private Professional Practice
(New York, Free Press, 1963), 3.
16 Ibid, 7; Carlin, supra n. 53, 9.
57 D. Rosenthal, Lawter and Client: Whos in Charge? (New York, Russell Sagc Foundation, 1974), 183.
11 A. Sarat and X. Felstiner, Divorce Law yers and their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal Process (New
York, Oxford University Press, 1995); W. Fclstincr and A. Sarat, "Enactments of Powcr: Negotiating Reality and
Responsibility in Law) er Client Relations" (1992) 77 Cornell Law Review 1447; A. Sarat and X. Felstiner, "Law
and Strategy in the Divorce Law Office" (1986) 20 Law and Sociely Review 93.
19 One of the most recent studies b) Niather, lcLwen and \laiman followed O'Gorman in interv iewing a sam
plc ot divorce lawyers identified from the court lists: L. Mather, C. \cEwcn and R. Maiman, Divorce LawJers at
Work: Varieties of Proessionalism in Practice (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001), 195; L. Mather,
R. Maiman and C. McEwcn, "'The Passenger Decides on the Destination and I Decide on the Route': Arc Divorce
Lawyers 'Expensive Cab Drivers'?" (1995) 9 International Journal ofLaw and the Family 286. Another common
method has been content analysis of lawyers' or court files: ee, or example, R. Inglcby, Solicitors and Divorce (New
York, Oxford University Press, 1992), 13 15; R. Hunter, A. Genovese, A. Chrzanonski and C. Morris, The
Changing Face of'Litiation: Unrepresented Litigants in the Famil, Court ofl Ausralia (Sydney, Law and Justice
Foundation of New South Wales, 2002); R. Hinds and E. Bradshaw, "Gender Bias in Lawyers' Affidavits to the
Family Court of Australia" (2005) 43 Family Court Review 445.
60 j. Flood, "Doing Business: The Management of Uncertainty in Lawyers' WXork" (1991) 25 Law and Sotiety
Review 41 ; R. Granficld, Making Elite L amers: Visions ofLam at Harvard and Betond (New York, Routlcdgc, 1992).
61 Rosenthal, supra n. 57, 100 1.
62 See, for example, the cases discussed in Mather el al (2001), supra n. .59, 46-47.
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how to carry out their work. 63 Put simply, lawyers are constantly required to make decisions
about matters that are central to their work, and some of these decisions involve elements of
choice. For example, lawyers must decide which clients they will represent, how the clients'
expectations will be acted upon or "managed", in what manner communications with clients
and others will be handled, what steps in advancing the client's interests will be taken and
when, under what circumstances the termination of the relationship will be chosen or rec-
ommended, and what fees will be charged, and why. It is necessary to emphasise that the
terms "choice" and "choice making" are intended here as shorthand, descriptive terms 64 for
an activity that may, at times, be constrained by a variety of influences.
The choice making in lawyering that is demonstrated in the social scientific literature
would seem to be significant from the point of view of lawyers' ethical practices. Unless the
kinds of choices and decisions that lawyers are shown routinely to make are morally
insignificant, they are, properly speaking, matters of ethical significance. 6 They implicate
the question of what it means to be a good lawyer in an ethical sense, as distinct from a good
lawyer in a technical sense.
The question of how lawyers ought to make choices when faced with certain kinds of eth-
ical dilemmas has long been the basis of the legal ethics project. Indeed, legal ethics has been
concerned to offer normative solutions to particular moments of choice making. These
moments have often involved questions and dilemmas concerning matters such as who to
represent, conflicts of interest, and client privilege, while professional responsibility rules
often seek to provide lawyers with guidance on how they ought to respond to these kinds of
dilemmas.
However, the social scientific research suggests that, in addition to choice making that is
recognised and regulated by norms of professional responsibility, lawyers are also continu-
ally faced with choices at the routine and even the mundane levels of legal practice.66 Choice
making, therefore, is pervasive and is not confined to textbook dilemmas. Indeed, as
Blumberg pointed out, "much legal work is... simply a few words of advice, some preven-
tative action, a telephone call, negotiations of some kind, a form filled out and filed, a hurried
conference ... a letter or opinion written, or a countless variety of... actions". 67 These sorts
of activities also probably constitute much of what it means to practise law. They are what
63 Wc have provided a more exhaustive account of' the claim about lawycr-choice in M. Robertson and
K. Tranter, "The Concept of Discretion and Choice in the Law) er's Role, and its Possible Implications for Legal
Education" (Paper presented at the Socio-Lcgal Research Centre Seminar Series, Gold Coast, Australia, 3 April
2006).
64 We do not wish to muddy these descriptive terms with normative assessments of choicc making in psychology
or economics, for example, which might suggest that all choice making in ol es indi idual self maximisation. There
is evidence, both anccdotally and in the empirical literature, that some lawyers in some circumstances resolve choice
moments according to this type of calculus; and there is also ex idence to the contrary. Our concern at this point is
the description, not the assessment. Similarly, what the evidence of lawyer choice making might contribute to the
agency /structure debate in social theory, or contribute to the philosophical literature on the possibility /impossibil
ity of frcc will, we defcr to a later date.
61 D. Luban, Law yers and Justie: An Ethial Stud y (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Uni ersity Press, 1988), xxiii.
66 For a description of the kinds of services that lawyers perform, see R. Abel and P. Iewis, "Putting Iaw Back
into the Sociology of Law ers" in Law yers in Solety: Comparative Theories (Berkeley, CA, Uni ersity of California
Press, 1989), 487.
67 A. Blumberg, "1he Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession" (1967)
1 Law and Societv Review 15, 25.
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lawyers, regardless of their station, do most of the time,68 while the way in which lawyers
perform them indicates their style of practice.
The social scientific studies provide many instances of lawyer activity involving decision
making that might be viewed as "routine". Some of these have focused on lawyer-client
relations. 69 They demonstrate that different lawyers often make very different choices con-
cerning client participation. For example, Southworth, in her study of civil rights and
poverty lawyers in Chicago, observed that the "lawyers' views about the proper allocation of
decisionmaking [sic] roles between lawyer and client vary substantially by the type of prac-
tice setting in which they work".711 Mather, McEwen and Maiman reported that the lawyer
makes an assessment of the complexity of the divorce and the client's ability to negotiate with
their ex-partner as the basis for choosing how much "responsibility" the lawyer has in the
matter.
7 1
Many of these routine, and sometimes mundane, decisions come down to some very basic
choices: whether the lawyer chooses to listen actively;72 whether the lawyer chooses to return
telephone calls promptly;7 3 and the verbal and non-verbal messages that the lawyer commu-
nicates to a client.' 4 A significant choice is which words a lawyer chooses to use. How a lawyer
frames advice often affects how a client understands and acts on that advice. Rosenthal, Sarat
and Felstiner, and Mather, McEwen and Maiman all report evidence of lawyers actively
exploiting the framing of advice, and using rhetorical tools and strategies to manage clients
and their expectations. 7" Uphoff and Wood found that among criminal defence attorneys
across the United States there were significantly different choices concerning the level of
client participation encouraged by attorneys. 76 Even William Simon, reflecting on the
evidence of his own previous legal practice, has suggested that two lawyers who choose to
communicate the same factual and legal material in different ways can provoke significantly
different responses in the same client.7
7
Social scientific researchers have also observed that lawyers make different choices with
regard to how to progress the client's matter solely on the basis of the lawyer's assumption
6S Flood suggests that "corporate lawyers spend roughly 55 percent ofthcir chargeable time in some form of talk
with others... Those others are a mixture of other lawyers, clients, colleagues, and helpers": Flood, supra n. 60,
48.
69 Rosenthal, supra n. 57; B. Danet, K. Hoffman and N. Kermish, "Obstacles to the Study of Law er Client
Interaction: The Biography of a Failure" (1980) 14 Law and Society Review 905; Sarat and Fclstincr (1995), supra
n. 58.
7' A. Southworth, "Lawycr-Clicnt Dccisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An Empirical Study of'
Lawyers' Norms" (1996) 9 Geo getown.Journal of Legal Ethial 1101, 1105. Similar findings were made b) Robertson
and Corbin in their limited study of Australian personal injury and family lawyers: A. Robertson and L. Corbin,
"To Enable or to Reliev e? Specialist Law) ers' Perceptions of Client In olv ement in Legal Serv ice Deliv ery" (2005)
12 InternationalfJournal o/'lhe Legal Pro ssion 121.
71 Mather et al (2001), supra n. 59, 71.
72 1. White, "Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the IIcaring ofMrs G" in
Al. Fineman and N. Sweet Thomadson (eds), At the Boundaries of'Law: leminism and Legal Theo y (New York,
Routlcdgc, 1991), 40.
73 Rosenthal, supra n. 57, 103.
74 Jbid, 101.
7' Ibid 109 10. Sarat and Felstiner (1995), supra n. 58, 37, 57; Mlather et al (2001), supra n. 59, 95 98.
76 R. Uphoff and P. Wood, "The Allocation of Dccisionmaking between Defense Counsel and Criminal
Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney Client Decisionmaking" (1998) 47 University qf Kansas Law Review 1.
77 W. Simon, "Iawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case" (1991) 50 Maryland Law Review 213,
216 17.
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about the client's capacity to pay.78 Similarly, there is evidence that lawyers often make dif-
ferent choices and pursue different courses of action depending on their relationship with the
lawyer representing the opposing party.79 Hunter, drawing upon empirical studies of divorce
lawyers, concluded that the assembled evidence suggested that individual lawyers working in
the same field and servicing similar clients often adopt different styles of advocacy, ranging
from aggressively adversarial to conciliatory. 8
The claim that lawyers have choices, derived from the social scientific studies of lawyers
at work, needs to be distinguished from a normative assessment of the appropriateness or
correctness of such choice making. Such assessments are not of concern here. However, this
issue does lead to a question about whether the evidence suggests that lawyers have uncon-
strained discretion in the way that they exercise their choices. It is clear, however, that this
is not the case. Instead, in spite of variations in findings, the studies have repeatedly found
that the "context" of lawyering constrains, regulates and influences lawyer choice. Three ele-
ments of the context that merit mention here are the rules of professional responsibility, the
professional practice context and the personality and values of the lawyer.
The first influence on lawyer choices involves the rules of professional practice. In
common with the scepticism in parts of the legal ethics literature concerning the efficacy of
rules to secure "ethical" outcomes, social scientific studies have found that professional
responsibility rules frequently do not determine "correct" courses of action. On the contrary,
they are often abstract and open to multiple interpretations and therefore require discre-
tionary judgment by the lawyer."1 To use Karl Llewellyn's words, "rules guide, but they do
not control".,2 However, as A/lather, M/IcEwen and Maiman showed in their study of the no-
conflict rule, while the rule did not provide clear guidance as to how lawyers should resolve
the situation when both parties presented at the initial interview, all lawyers interviewed
recognised the essence of the rule that to continue the interview in those circumstances
would be wrong. 3 This suggests a more sophisticated account of the relationship between
professional practice rules and lawyer conduct: that the rules highlight recognised areas of
concern, close some avenues of choice, and signpost to lawyers the need for deliberation in
the areas of discretion that persist.
The second contextual factor is the professional environment of the lawyer. Studies have
repeatedly found that factors such as firm policies, "firm culture" and the lawyer's position
within the hierarchy of the firm limit the range of choices available to him or her.8 4 An
example of this can be seen in relation to billing practices. M\1ather, McEwen and Maiman
found that senior lawyers or sole practitioners enjoy "freedom" when it comes to adjusting
their fees, while junior lawyers, subject to firm policy or work expectations, often do
7 S. Lacaula), "Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws" (1979) 14 Law and Society Review 115, 151-71;
J. Carlin and J. Howard, "Lcgal Rcprcscntation and Class Justice" (1965) 12 (C174 Law Review 381, 385;
H. O'Gorman, supra n. 55; Rosenthal, supra n. 57, 107.
71 Sarat and Fclstincr (1995), swpra n. 58, 103; \lathcr et al(2001), supra n. 59, 74, 128-30.
10 R. Hunter, "Adversarial Nythologies: Policy Assumptions and Research Evidence in Family Law" (2003) 30
Journal of/Law and Sociel * 156.
"l Mather et al (2001), supra n. 59, 47.
S2 K.I.lcwcllyn, The Bramble Bush: On our Law and its Stud' (Dobbs Fcrry, NY, Ocean Publications, 1930), 180.
3Mather et al (2001), supra n. 59, 46, 71.
S4 For example, Southworth, supra n. 70 (on thc diversity cvcn within 'povcrty' law practice in Chicago); Uphoff
and Wood, supra n. 76 (on the more client centred approach of public defenders in contrast to private members of
thc criminal bar).
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not.8-S However, even junior lawyers in this situation are invested with some opportunities
for choice: the researchers found that a junior lawyer still reduced a client's bill by "not
record[ing] every phone call on her time sheet for billing".8 6
Another aspect of the constraining professional environment concerns the expectations
and pressures from the lawyer's "community of practice".8 7 Most lawyers wish to be seen in
a good light by their peers.88 Regardless of whether this is a genuine need for acceptance or
a pragmatic decision based on maintaining relationships, what it discloses is that the com-
munity of practice influences lawyers' choice making.89 However, this does not mean that a
lawyer's community of practice somehow relieves the need for choice, or dictates the deci-
sion; the study merely demonstrates that the community of practice influences the choice
that is made.
A third element that influences lawyers' choice making, as identified in the social scientific
literature, has to do with the "person" and values of the lawyer concerned. Carlin found that
demographic details, particularly social-economic status and race, determined a lawyer's
type of practice and as such influenced the kind of decisions and choices that he or she
made. 911 Sarat and Felstiner and Mather, McEwen and Maiman observed that gender had
an impact on how individual lawyers practise, 91 although other studies have disputed the
generality of their findings. 92 Empirical studies on law schools have suggested that some of
the consistency among lawyers in how they respond to moments of choice comes from the
shared values that lawyers acquire at law school.9 3 Furthermore, Corbin has recently found
that lawyers' decisions should be conceived as a complex mediation of personality types,
I Mather, MlcEwen and \Laiman note the "freedom" that sole practitioners and senior partners had in making
these choices: MNlathcr el al (2001), supra n. 59, 137.
86 Ibid, 34.
17 lathcr, M\lcEwcn and M\laiman definc community of practicc as having "many dimensions. It includcs sharc
languages, knowledge and identities that together reinforce common understandings of the challenges of particular
kinds of lcgal work. It involvcs intcrnalizcd norms of conduct lcarncd in life, in law school, and during socialization
into practice. It includes pressures from peers to behax e in particular way s in order to function effecti ely in a sxs
tcm of relationships" (ibid, 178).
" Carlin, supra n. 53, 116 17.
'9 Mathcr el al (2001), swpra n. 59, 175-87.
'0 Carlin, supra n. 53. This finding was mirrored b) Heinz and Laumann's 1975 surve) of Chicago lawyers:
J. I Icinz and E. Iaumann, Chicago Lamers: The Social Sruclure of ihe Bar (New York, Russell Sage Foundation,
1982);J. Heinz, E. Laumann, R. Nelson and E. Michelson, "The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago
in 1975 and 1995" (1998) 32 Law and Society Review 751.
91 'There has been some support for this thesis from studies of div orce law)yers: Sarat and Felstiner (1995), supra
n. 58, 103; \athcr e al(2001), supra n. 59, 169-71.
" B. Bogoch, "Gendered Lawyering: Difference and Dominance in Lawyer Client Interactions" (1997) 31 Law
andSociej, Review 677. The claim that gender impacts on lawycring styles is controversial: see D. Jack and R. Jack,
"Women Law) ers: Archetype and Alternatix es" in C. Gilligan, J. Ward, J. McLean Ta lor and B. Bardige (eds),
Mapping the Moral Domain: A Contribution of'Women's Thinking to Ps,chological Theory and Education (Cambridge,
MAI, Harvard University Press, 1988), 263; C. Menkel Meadow, "Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawycring Process" (1985) 1 Berkeley Wnoen's Law Journal 39; C. Mcnkcl-\cadow, "Exploring a
Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change" (1989) 14
Law and Social Inquiry, 289, 296.
13 Granfield, supra n. 60; M. Stewart, "Conflict and Connection at Sydney University Law School: Twelve
Women Speak of our Legal Education" (1992) 18 Melbourne Universi, Law Review 826; R. Stovcr, Making it and
Breaking it: The Fate of Public Interest Commitment During Law School (Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press,
1989); A. Schwartz, "Iaw, Iawycrs and Law School: Perspectives from the First-Ycar Class" (1980) 30 Journal of
Legal Lducation 437. Although there hav e been some dissenting N oices with regard to the impact of law school on
student values: Evans and Palermo, supra n. 42.
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personal values and external pressures. 94 Common to all this research is the finding that, to
some degree, the lawyer's personal values influence the quality of choice making.
A final point that warrants mention concerns the generality of the social scientific studies
to which we have referred. Mlost of this research, but certainly not all of it,9' has been
conducted in the United States. Indeed, the sociology of the professions had its origins in the
United States with the work of Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton. 96 We suggest, how-
ever, that even given jurisdictional and societal differences, the core research findings regard-
ing the nature of attorneys' work are likely to be applicable to lawyers' work in other common
law jurisdictions.
In summary, the social scientific research presents evidence of the fact that lawyering
involves choice and that those choices are made within a context that includes rules, profes-
sional expectations, and personal values. These decisions are regularly made in what may be
described as zones of discretion that are an inevitable feature of the lawyer's role. The mat-
ters that invite choice making are numerous and varied. They include the minutiae of prac-
tice, such as deciding which adjectives to use in a letter to the client's opponent, 97 through to
the more celebrated instances of decision making, such as those generated by situations of
conflict of interest. In terms of sheer volume and perhaps significance however, the rou-
tine, seemingly innocuous circumstances of choice making dominate much lawyering, and
therefore define a lawyer's style of practice. 98 Furthermore, to the extent that the decisions
that lawyers need to make are morally significant ones, this empirical literature can add a
great deal to our understanding of the way in which lawyers exercise ethical choices. Viewed
from this perspective, much of what constitutes legal practice is made up of a series of
judgment calls9 9 (assuming "judgment" in its ordinary sense of deciding sensibly). The
lawyer, to underscore the point, therefore does not automatically perform the multiple acts
of practice in accordance with a predetermined script. Legal practice always, and often,
invites lawyers to make decisions as to how they will provide their services"' even if, in the
circumstances that happen to prevail, the opportunity for choice is constrained by those cir-
cumstances, or even if the opportunity to deliberate is passed over completely.
The "Discretion, Choice and Justification" Approach
to Legal Ethics Learning
These conclusions suggest the basis of an alternative approach to legal ethics learning. They
suggest that learning about ethical responsibility ought to reflect the reality that much
lawyering is inevitably carried out in zones of professional discretion, rather than being
carried out by the application of categorical practice rules. In other words, the primary
14 L. Corbin, "How 'Firm' are Law) ers' Perceptions of Professionalism?" (2005) 8 Legal Ethics 265, 272-4.
9" For example, M. Cain, "The General Practice I.awycr and the Client" in R. Dingwall and P. L.cwis (cds), The
Sociolot y f the Pro/essions: Law~yers, Docto;" and Others (London, Macmillan, 1983), 106; Corbin, supra n. 94;
Sluntcr, supra n. 80; Robcrtson and Corbin, swpra n. 70.
96 L. Freidson, "The Theory of the Professions: State of the Art" in R. Dingwall and P. Lewis (eds), The
Sociology o/lhe Pro,ssions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others (London, Macmillan, 1983), 19.
'7 See also, for example, P. Schiltz, "Making Ethical Lawyers" (2004) 45 South Texas Law Review 875, 877.
98 See, for example, Iazard, supra n. 46, 138.
N Lather et al (2001), supra n. 59; Hutchinson, supra n. 16; Luban and Lilleman, supra n. 15, Schiltz, supra n. 97.
100 See also IIazard's claim along these lines: Hazard, supra n. 46, 129, 138.
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emphasis in this approach should be on the responsibility to deliberate the everyday ques-
tions of lawyering in a domain that is only partly serviced by rules,1 1' rather than on "know-
ing" the formal ingredients of the lawyer's rule-based morality.
Students should therefore be provided with opportunities to learn that lawyers' work
inevitably involves discretion and choice, 1 12 that much decision making in the course of
ordinary, everyday practice involves the making of morally significant choices, and that these
choices are often situated in demanding contexts. However, because lawyers' ethical deci-
sions, like any other ethical decisions, always require justification, 1 3 students must also be
encouraged to develop a thorough understanding of the practitioner's enduring responsibil-
ity to justify ethical choices in the course of legal practice. 10 4 The goal, ultimately, must be
that students begin to develop their ability to make justifiable choices, to the extent that law
school learning activities can encourage this development to take place.
In this part of the paper we explore, somewhat tentatively, some of the possible advantages
that this approach might have for ethics learning and teaching. At the outset, however, we
recognise that learning theory should and can inform the ethics project in legal education.'0o
This requires, for example, clarity about what students should learn, 16 and the creation of a
learning environment that is most likely to allow most students to achieve these objectives.
And, as far as possible, students should be encouraged into high quality learning outcomes,
rather than low-level ones that merely involve the formulaic reproduction of knowledge. 17
(An approach to ethics in legal education that prioritises the "transmission"'1" 8 of profes-
sional responsibility rules into the minds of students is surely of questionable value.)
The "discretion, choice and justification" approach to legal ethics learning provides a
foundation for learning about the complexity and therefore the challenge of lawyers' ethical
responsibility. It provides a basis for, and encourages students into, a broad enquiry into the
meaning of ethical lawyering. It aims to take learning far beyond knowledge of a set of legal
rules that must be applied to resolve occasional professional dilemmas. It begins with the
claim that professional legal services inevitably invite deliberation as to whom and how to
represent, rather than with the claim that the rules of professional responsibility are likely to
provide answers to all the ethical dilemmas that actually matter. It nevertheless accepts that
101 Ibid.
102 Wc noted earlier that this message is not reflected in conventional approaches to teaching and learning of legal
ethical responsibility in Australian legal education. 'To the best of our knowledge, neither does it appear, in these
terms, in the substantial American literature on legal ethics in legal education. Scc, for example, I. Lcrman and
P. Schrag, Ethical Problems in the Pm riuce of Law (New York, Aspen, 2005).
103 See, tbr cxamplc, P. Singer, Prac icalEithics (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2nd cdn, 1993), 10-12.
104 We acknowledge that the call for justification is based upon sophisticated arguments both in moral philosophy
and in the litcraturc on legal ethics in particular. Ilcrc, wc do no more than state and accept the proposition in thc
context of our argument. We note merely that the very office of law) er attracts a particular kind of responsibility:
lawycrs' rolcs arc, in a scnsc, public oncs, and this means that lawyers must be willing to account for the way in which
the) serv ice their clients' needs, before both the courts and other legal institutions. For an Australian account of the
need for lawyers to be accountable, see Sampford and Parker, supra n. 13, 19-24; S. Parker, supra n. 13, 4. For other
perspectives see, for example, Luban, supra n. 65.
'05 Robcrtson, supra n. 21.
106 P. Ramsden, Learning to Teach in Higher Education (New York, Routledgel'almer, 2003), 125 6; J. Biggs,
TeahiinJbr Qualiiy Learning at (fniversi, (Buckingham, Open University Press, 2003), 34-55; Robertson, supra n. 21.
107 Biggs, ibid, 38-43, and Al. Le Brun and R. Johnstone, The Quiet Rezolution: Jmproving Student Learning in
Law (Sydney, Lawbook Co, 1994), 160-4, referring to an adaptation of Bloom's taxonomy; and scc Robcrtson, supra
n. 21,234-5.
lOS Australian Law Reform Commission, supra n. 2.
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the rules of lawyering are a crucial, but not an exclusive, resource in deliberation and choice
making. The essential message, however, is that ethical legal practice is less about rules that
have to be followed than about individual choices that need to be made.
This inquiry into lawyers' ethical responsibility acknowledges the multiple circumstances
of ethical decision making. It draws attention to the under-studied, "routine and banal" 1 19
circumstances of ethical choice making, rather than only those that tend to dominate the dis-
course on lawyers' professional responsibility. As we suggested earlier, legal practice fre-
quently invites lawyers to make decisions of moral significance, and certainly not only when
issues like conflict of interest or confidentiality arise. Lawyers frequently need to make
choices about seemingly "small" things, such as when and whether to return calls and emails,
and what language to use in the many manifestations of their role as communicator.110
Therefore, students will not only be encouraged to question the implication that the rules of
lawyering somehow provide a comprehensive resource for ethical decision making. They will
also be encouraged to question the implication that the circumstances of lawyering empha-
sised in the address of the professional rules appropriately reflect all the likely circumstances
in which ethical decisions need frequently to be made. In this way, students might also come
to appreciate the extent to which the "small" lawyering decisions, as opposed to the "big"
ones, help to define the characteristics of the lawyer.
At the same time, this approach invites, if not requires, students to begin to get to grips
with the situational factors that constrain lawyers' choices. Thus, for example, students can
learn to recognise and evaluate the likely effects of firm and wider practice pressures, and the
extent to which these might influence practice decisions. The social scientific literature on
lawyers' work would provide an especially valuable resource for this, which suggests that
parts of this literature need to be brought into the mainstream of ethics learning.
This approach also provides a framework for the examination of various other literatures
that address questions of lawyers' ethical responsibility. These include the normative litera-
ture on lawyering, and especially the scholarship that examines the ethical justification for
the lawyer's role (and role-differentiated behaviour), and the scholarship that contains the
arguments about how lawyers ought to make choices in the course of lawyering. 111 Students
should be encouraged to evaluate these sorts of arguments 1l 2 in an effort to encourage the
development of their own conceptions of what they believe should influence their choices as
practitioners, within the discretionary zones that they encounter. Ideally, students should
also be encouraged to explore, at introductory level, the moral, philosophical dimensions of
legal ethical decision making.' 13
As we see it, the "discretion, choice and justification" approach brings the decision maker
into focus. It acknowledges that there is a subjective element in lawyering, and that this ele-
ment has a bearing on the choices that lawyers routinely make. Students should learn to
appreciate that different lawyers deliberate differently and respond in justifiably different
ways to similar sets of circumstances that require decisions. In a sense, then, this approach
109 C. Parker, supra n. 13.
110 Rhode and Luban, supra n. 45, 1.
... See, as one example, D. Iuban (cd), The Elhic" of'Law.yers (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1994).
112 Such as the merits of "neutral partisanship" as opposed to "moral activism" in law)ering; see, for example,
Simon, supra n. 11 ; and for a more recent contribution, S. Schcingold and A. Sarat, Sonicihing lo Believe in: Polilics,
Pro/essionalism, and Cause Lawyering (Stanford, CA, Stanford Uni ersity Press, 2004).
113 On the philosophy of cthics as it pertains to legal ethics see, for example, Nicolson and Webb, supra n. 10, ch 2.
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personalises learning about the ethical: it encourages students to learn about their own abil-
ities and frailties in responding to invitations to make ethical choices. It follows that this
approach also provides opportunities for students to engage with their own moral perspec-
tives, to interrogate their own moral positions, and to consider the role that these might have
in making defensible decisions during the course of their legal work. 114
As we have indicated, students should be called upon to provide justifications for the
choices that they make, as and when they engage with learning activities and assessment tasks
that call for decision making. In this way, students may begin to develop their abilities to
make justifiable practice choices. The requirement for justification of choice is not intended
as an invitation to offer the barest possible reason for a particular choice, or for self-serving
justification,1 ' I but to demonstrate a thorough engagement with the matter calling for con-
sideration together with a sound understanding of the nature of the lawyer's role.
Finally, we draw attention to the fact that the approach to legal ethics learning being
suggested here is one that highlights the place of, and need for, ethical deliberation in the
practice of law. It is clear from what has been said so far that ethical deliberation and deci-
sion making, in the discretionary zones of practice, is not merely a matter of learning how to
apply the rules of lawyering. It follows that this approach to ethics learning suggests the need
for strategies and resources to be developed that will aid and enhance learning activities in
this area. These strategies and resources will need to take different forms, but their aim
would be to provide students with opportunities to consider quite carefully the potential
complexity and richness of different decision making contexts. One such resource, to aid the
development of reflective engagement with ethical dilemmas, could take the form of a series
of questions or prompts, as the following example shows. These particular questions assume
a decision making context in which the rules of professional responsibility may have a bear-
ing on the decision that needs to be made: 116
* What issue must you decide?
* How do you interpret the facts that you think are relevant to the decision that must be
made?
* Potentially, what options are available to you?
* Are there any formal sources of legal authority that provide guidance (for example,
statutes or case law on lawyers' responsibilities, or formally recognised professional
responsibility rules)? How would you interpret these? Are these actually determinative
of the issue you identified?
* Are there any other sources of legal authority (such as rules or guidelines provided by
professional bodies) that provide assistance? How would you interpret these?
* Are there any other sources of guidance, including personal moral ones, which you think
are relevant here?
114 It is worth noting that some recent literature on lawy ers' ethical practices highlights the place and Nalue of
personal moral perspective in decision making. See, for example, Vischcr, supra n. 8, 46, 54: there arc "personal and
professional benefits" in "integrating one's own moral claims with one's work"; and Hutchinson, supra n. 16, ch 11.
" Singer, supra n. 103.
116 This approach was initially formulated in 2004 by Michael Robertson as part of the Griffith Law School's
"I.cgal Professional Practice" course. It has undergone a number of revisions, and is still being developed. As we see
it, a resource like this can be adapted to the various learning activ ities and learning contexts of the typical law school
environment but it should not be viewed as a "formula" for decision making itself.
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* Whose interests are potentially affected by the decision?
* How would you prioritise these interests, and why?
* What are the likely consequences of each of the options identified? How would you eval-
uate these consequences?
* Are there any other factors that you think you should take into account in these circum-
stances?
* Are there any situational influences or pressures that seem to make the decision more
difficult?
* To what extent do you believe that these pressures should be taken into account? (Can
they be ignored?)
" Given your responses to these questions, what decision would you make?
* How would you justify your decision? (Why exactly do you think this would be a good
decision in the circumstances?)
* Do you have any misgivings about any aspect of the decision? Why?
This resource helps to illustrate key elements of the approach to the learning of legal ethics
that we are suggesting: the need for thoughtful engagement with ethical questions, the pos-
sible relevance of different forms of moral reasoning (including recourse to guiding norms
and the evaluation of consequences of actions), the relevance of personal values and morality
in decision making, an acknowledgement of the force of variable contextual factors, the need
for justification, and the need for subsequent reflection. In short, the principal aim of this
approach is to draw the learner's attention to the demanding nature of ethical decision mak-
ing in a legal practice setting, and to encourage careful deliberation in confronting the ethi-
cal challenges of ordinary practice.
Conclusion
We began by asking what Australian law students should learn from the legal ethics project
in legal education. The short version of the answer we have suggested is that students must
appreciate that morally significant issues continually emerge during lawyers' work, and often
at moments of situational complexity. Students ought therefore to be encouraged to engage
with these issues from a position that not only acknowledges the uncertainty of legal practice,
but also recognises the kind of responsibility that pervasive professional discretion demands.
Our underlying purpose has been to take seriously the frequent criticisms of the traditional,
rules-based approach to the teaching of "legal ethics", and to propose an alternative
approach: one that recognises that ethical legal practice is less about rules that have to be fol-
lowed than about professional choices that need to be made in the demanding and variable
contexts of lawyering.
If there is a single claim that provides a platform for the arguments that we have made, it
is the claim of the social scientific literature, as we interpret it, that legal practice is uncertain,
and the attendant implication that lawyers must therefore choose how they will respond to
the multiple choices that present themselves in ordinary lawyering. This need to make deci-
sions in the discretionary zones of practice necessarily places significant moral responsibili-
ties on lawyers and, arguably, on legal educators too.
